An account of scientific representation in terms of partial structures and partial morphisms is further developed. It is argued that the account addresses a variety of difficulties and challenges that have recently been raised against such formal accounts of representation. This allows some useful parallels between representation in science and art to be drawn, particularly with regard to apparently inconsistent representations. These parallels suggest that a unitary account of scientific and artistic representation is possible, and our article can be viewed as laying the groundwork for such an accountalthough, as we shall acknowledge, significant differences exist between these two forms of representation.
Introduction
There has been considerable discussion of scientific representation over the past 15 years or so, but little agreement on what would be an appropriate account. From among the various debates and considerations, one can discern a number of criticisms and concerns that have been deployed against certain formal accounts. Our aim in this work is to develop further a formal account previously given in terms of partial isomorphisms (Bueno [1997] ; Bueno et al. [2002] ; French [2003] ), and in doing so to respond to these criticisms and concerns. Since some of these criticisms involve a comparison of representation in science and art, our analysis will also shed some light on this issue (see also van Fraassen [2008] ). As we shall see, such comparisons need to be handled with care. We shall begin by recalling the formal details of our account, before tackling a set of fundamental issues concerning the relationship between representation in art and science, the impact of examples from the former on the latter, and the general question of the shape a unitary framework, if any, for representation should take.
to R, and R 3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not defined whether they belong or not to R. (Bueno [1997] ; French and Ladyman [1999] ).
2 Of course, if R k3 ¼ R 0 k3 ¼ ;, so that we no longer have partial structures but 'total' ones, then we recover the standard notion of isomorphism (see Bueno [1997] ).
Moreover, we say that a (partial) function f: D ! D 0 is a partial homomorphism from A to A 0 if for every x and every y in D, R k1 xy ! R 0 k1 f ðxÞf ðyÞ and R k2 xy ! R 0 k2 f ðxÞf ðyÞ (Bueno, French, and Ladyman [2002] ). Again, if R k3 and R 0 k3 are empty, we obtain the standard notion of homomorphism as a particular case.
We can then define a notion of quasi-truth (see, e.g. da Costa and French [2003] ) as follows: if B is a total structure, whose relations of arity n are defined for all n-tuples of elements of its universe, and if P is a set of accepted sentences, 3 then B is said to be A-normal if: (i) the universe of B is D;
(ii) the relations of B extend the corresponding partial relations of A;
(iii) if c is an individual constant, then c is interpreted by the same element in both A and B;
(iv) if s 2 P, then B s (where '' stands for the logical consequence relation in the Tarskian sense).
That is, loosely speaking, a total structure B is called A-normal if it has the same similarity type as A, its relations extend the corresponding partial relations of A, and the sentences of P are true, in the Tarskian sense, in B. Then a sentence s is said to be quasi-true in a partial structure A, or in the domain D that A partially reflects, if there is an A-normal structure B and s is true in the Tarskian sense in B. Clearly, A is not conceived of as reflecting the (total) 1 To avoid a possible confusion between R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 and particular occurrences of a partial relation R i , we will always refer to the former as R 1 -, R 2 -, and R 3 -components of the partial relation R i . 2 For simplicity, we are considering here only two-place relations. But the definition can, of course, be easily extended to n-place relations. 3 This set of accepted sentences P represents the accepted information about the structure's domain. Depending on the interpretation of science that is adopted, different kinds of sentences are to be introduced in P: realists will typically include laws and theories, whereas empiricists will add mainly certain regularities and observational statements about the domain in question.
structure of D, but as only partially mirroring this domain. Thus, the partial structure A has to capture some fundamental aspects of D, or some 'elements of truth', although it does not mirror D perfectly. For simplicity, we can say that a sentence s is quasi-true if there is a partial structure A and a corresponding A-normal structure B in which s is true (in the Tarskian sense). If s is not quasi-true (in a partial structure A according to an A-normal structure B), then s is said to be quasi-false (in A according to B). In order to clarify these concepts, it should be noted that quasi-truth is strictly weaker than truth, in the sense that if a sentence is true, then it is quasi-true, but the converse doesn't hold in general. Moreover, if a sentence is quasi-false, then it is false, but the converse doesn't hold in general either. (For further details, see Bueno [2000] , and da Costa and French [2003] .) Furthermore, it is also possible that a sentence s is quasi-true and its negation, :s, is quasi-true as well. Does that mean that their conjunction, s and :s, is quasi-true? That is, can an inconsistent theory be quasi-true? Given the account presented above, the answer is negative: we are working with classical structures, and no contradiction can be true in such structures. However, we can still use the framework to make room for inconsistent theories, particularly given the heuristic role they have played in science (see, for example, da Costa and French [2003] , Chapter 5). Here is a way of tackling this issue. If a theory T is inconsistent, we say that T is weakly quasi-true in a partial structure A if there are 'strong' subsets of T's theorems that are quasi-true, that is such theorems are true in some A-normal structure. (We take strong to be a pragmatic notion, involving theories that are explanatory, have significant consequences, accommodate the relevant phenomena, etc.) In general, there are infinitely many 'sub-theories' of T that meet this condition. Of course, the interesting cases to consider are those in which A is a 'good' pragmatic structure, in the sense that it reflects well the informal counterpart of T (see da Costa and Bueno [2007] ). The ability to accommodate apparently inconsistent representations is a significant feature of our account, as we shall see below.
It is worth noting, of course, that other formal kinds of accounts are also available. Thus, Bartels ([2006] ), for example, has defended an approach to representation based on homomorphisms. The central notion is as follows (ibid., pp. 7-8) . 4 Consider the relational structure given by the one-up to n-place relations R . . . ; a n Þ. Condition (i) requires that for all relations R j B , if some images f (a 1 ), . . . , f (a n ) of the arguments a 1 , . . . , a n under f satisfy the relation, then the arguments also satisfy the corresponding relation R j A on A. In that case, f is called a faithful mapping of A onto B. The second condition is that the facts in B should give complete information about facts in A, so that for every fact in A there must be a corresponding (representing) fact in B:
(ii) For all j and all elements a i of A: if R A j ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ, then R B j ðf ða 1 Þ; . . . ; f ða n ÞÞ. If (i) and (ii) are fulfilled, f is a homomorphism from A onto B, and B, by virtue of the existence of f, can be said to be a homomorphic image of A (Dunn and Hardegree [2001] , p. 15). According to Bartels' account of representation B then represents A only if B is a homomorphic image of A. This is taken to have the advantage over isomorphism-based accounts because homomorphisms are not symmetric and so this approach does not fall prey to the criticisms levelled at 'similarity' theories of representation. Although this is true, cases do arise where the relevant relationship should be one of isomorphism. Suppose, for example, that we are interested in representing the number of particles in a given region. In that case, it's crucial for the success of that representation that the exact number is preserved in the representation. Isomorphism, in this case, is in order. Bartels can accommodate such cases by imposing appropriate conditions, but given that his account is exclusively based on homomorphism, these conditions need to be made explicitly and properly defended.
One might also worry that Bartels' conditions are too strong. Condition (i) blocks the possibility of there being 'facts' in the representing domain to which there are no corresponding 'facts' in the represented domain. Yet, it may be that representations contain surplus elements that, through empirical testing, come to be discarded. Completeness, as represented by condition (ii), may be desirable in the long run, but partial representations also play a significant role in science.
The partial structures account is more flexible in these respects and also supplies a unitary framework in terms of which one can define a notion of quasi-truth, as we have seen. This then allows us to capture the way in which information can be transferred from one partial structure to another, since partial structures between which a partial isomorphism holds are partially elementarily equivalent, 5 thus preserving the quasi-truth of the structures in question (Bueno [2000] ). For these reasons, although we have some sympathy for Bartels' approach, we think that the partial isomorphism account offers a better way forward.
An Example: Representation and Analogy in Superconductivity
Our approach has been applied to numerous case studies from science, where partial isomorphisms capture the way in which structure is imported from one domain to another in order to shape the relevant representation. Consider, as an example, the London and London model of superconductivity, here regarded as a particular instance of scientific representation (French and Ladyman [1997] ). In 1935, Fritz and Heinz London were trying to characterize appropriately the phenomenon of superconductivity, drawing on theoretical considerations associated with Maxwell's theory. By invoking a crucial analogy with diamagnetism, they managed to construct a 'macroscopic' model that incorporated a core experimental result (the so-called 'Meissner effect') that adequately represented the phenomenon-in terms of a fundamental equation obtained from Maxwell's theory-without explaining the mechanisms behind it. The crucial idea was to take the magnetic behaviour of a superconductor as being similar to that of a diamagnetic substance (that is, one with a strong negative susceptibility). The effect of introducing this analogy was to shift the characterization of superconductivity in terms of a current that persists in the absence of an electric or magnetic field, to one in terms of the current understood as a kind of diamagnetic volume current, whose existence is necessarily dependent upon the presence of a magnetic field. Thus, the critical feature of the analogy that was drawn upon at this stage of model construction was the relationship between the magnetic field and the current (captured by the R 1 components in the relevant partial structures). However, those aspects of the diamagnetic structure that were relevant for the microscopic understanding were not carried over (these can be captured by the R 3 components).
It was this further structure that proved to be of critical importance for the subsequent development of the 'microscopical' interpretation of superconductivity (Bueno et al. [unpublished] ). In particular, by considering a superconductor as a single big diamagnetic atom, and investigating the form of the current that would be obtained on quantum mechanical grounds, an expression for this current could be obtained that had exactly the same form as the expression for superconducting current flow. In subsequent work the quantum mechanical account of diamagnetism was assumed right from the start, and riding on the back of the analogy, as it were, was used to give the outlines of an explanation of superconductivity (Bueno et al. [unpublished] ). Here again (but without going into the technical details), further structure was imported from the diamagnetic domain, yielding something close to an isomorphism between the relevant structures (recall our comment on Bartels' proposal above). 6 Thus, as developments proceeded, elements previously captured by the R 3 components fall under the R 1 .
Here we see the way in which representations in science cannot only be motivated not only by empirical considerations but are also shaped by analogies with other domains. What was initially seen as simply a formal analogy between diamagnetism and superconductivity came to be understood as itself representing a more fundamental connection as the central equation above came to be derived from microscopic considerations.
All of these representations at the different stages of theoretical development can be characterized by suitable partial morphisms. First, structure was brought across from the domain of diamagnetism into the model of superconductivity, where the relationship is understood to be a formal one (in the sense that the models in question satisfied the same mathematical equation). Second, once it was realized that the analogy goes beyond such formal aspects, further structure in the form of the relevant relations between electrons was transferred across to yield a derivation of the core mathematical equation, now suitably interpreted at the microscopic level. At this point the phenomenon came to be characterized by its fundamental constituents.
There are two features of this (briefly outlined) episode to note. First, the inter-relationships between the relevant models and between them and the analogy, as well as the transfer of structure, can all be captured in terms of partial morphisms holding between partial structures. Secondly, the intentional stance of the principal participant (namely, Fritz London) is revealed in his drawing on the diamagnetic analogy to view a superconductor as a kind of diamagnet:
In contrast to the customary conception that in a supraconductor a current may persist without being maintained by an electric or magnetic field, the current is characterized as a kind of diamagnetic volume current, the existence of which is necessarily dependent upon the presence of a magnetic field. (London and London [1935], p. 88; emphasis added) The 'as' here indicates not only that there is an underlying analogy but also that a representational stance has been adopted: the superconductor is being represented as a kind of diamagnet.
Before considering an additional example from science (namely, Bohr's model of the atom) that will further illustrate the advantages of our approach, we shall briefly outline an account of representation in art that also draws on isomorphism. This will enable us to highlight both the parallels and differences between representation in science and art.
Representation and Isomorphism in Art
As is well known, comparisons have been drawn between representation in art and science, and these comparisons have been used, in particular, to motivate criticisms of the approach we advocate here (we shall discuss these criticisms below). As will become clear, we don't think such comparisons undermine the approach we favour, given certain differences that we shall highlight between the domains of science and art. Nevertheless, certain similarities can still be identified, and indeed are exemplified in our discussion of Bohr's model of the atom that we will consider shortly.
As French ([2003] ) noted, a similar (if less formalized) approach to ours, also invoking isomorphism, has been developed by Budd in the philosophy of art. This suggests that such formal notions-just as in the case of sciencehave some, albeit limited, applicability to representation in art. Since we shall return to this latter point below and shall also refer to Budd's approach several times in our discussion, let us just recall the details.
Budd's approach is crucially based on a distinction between one's 'visual world' and one's 'visual field', where the former is the complete way the world is represented to one by one's visual experience, and the latter is a certain aspect of the way the world is represented to one by one's visual experience (Budd [1993] , p. 158). The relationship between the two can be understood in terms of abstraction: Jill's visual experience represents the world as a collection of objects 'spread out in three-dimensional space' and her visual field is what is left when she abstracts the apparent distance of these objects from her. Thus, for example, if Jill's visual world contains a circular object which is tilted away from her, then within her visual field this object will appear elliptical (ibid.). This distinction is crucial because it is in these terms that Budd can capture the claim that a painting represents by sharing properties with its subject: a picture looks like what it depicts only with respect to properties of the spectator's visual field, not those confined to his visual world. (Budd [1993], p. 159) Budd then explicitly introduces isomorphism into this context, where this is taken to hold between the structure of the surface of the painting and the structure of the relevant visual field. Thus when you look at a painting, what you see is the structure of the surface of the painting as being isomorphic Otávio Bueno and Steven French with the structure of the visual field of the state of affairs that the painting depicts. Budd's account of pictorial representation can then be summarized as follows:
First, your experience must involve a visual awareness of the presence before you of a marked surface. Secondly, you must see the structure of the surface as being isomorphic with the structure of the visual field representation of the picture's subject when seen from a certain point of view, namely, that from which it has been depicted. (Budd [1993], p. 161) Or, even more succinctly: representation consists in the perceived isomorphism of structure (Budd [1993] , p. 162; emphasis added).
This framework can then accommodate a range of examples, such as Holbein's The Ambassadors, with its anamorphic representation of a skull that is structurally isomorphic to a skull when seen from the appropriate angle (ibid.). Other examples include the infamous Necker cube and more abstract works, such as Picasso's Head of a Girl and Braque's Pitcher and Violin, where the representation holds with regard to certain structural features (such as the loops and spirals in the Picasso and the curls of the girl's hair); and as noted in (French [2003] ), Budd's account may be extended to more complex works such as Picasso's Guernica, although not surprisingly certain complications arise, as we shall see below. Also, and significantly, Budd argues that his framework can also accommodate the representation of apparently impossible or contradictory objects, such as we find in the work of Escher, or, significantly as we shall shortly see, as in the case of the two/ three-pronged trident illusion, where, in Budd's terms, incompatible isomorphisms are involved.
As Budd indicates, it is important that any account of representation should be able to accommodate such examples as the above, including those involving apparently inconsistent representations. Moving back to the philosophy of science, the partial structures approach can accommodate apparently inconsistent scientific representations, and despite certain concerns that we shall consider below, we see this as a significant advantage.
Inconsistent Representations
Let us consider the classic example of such an apparently inconsistent representation, namely Bohr's model of the atom, in the light of the above. 7 The example is particularly interesting in this context since it raises the issue of whether, and in what sense, one can have inconsistent representations. One extreme (although widespread) response is to deny that such representations are possible, since inconsistent objects cannot exist. Among those responses that allow for the possibility of inconsistent representations, three options emerge: (a) inconsistent representations (at least in some cases) stand for actually existing inconsistent objects, that is, objects that have inconsistent properties (see Priest [2006] ). (b) Inconsistent representations, despite being possible, do not stand for existing inconsistent objects, since such representations are not true (this is the option we favour). (c) Inconsistent representations, although they may be possible, are never actual in the sense that we don't find them in scientific practice; the alleged cases of inconsistent scientific representations are just apparently inconsistent: further analysis shows that no inconsistency is actually present (Vickers [2008] , [2009] ). Let's consider each of these views in turn. The extreme response insists that inconsistent representations are not possible. At least two justifications can be given for such a claim: one is that objects possessing inconsistent properties are metaphysically impossible; the other is that, assuming classical logic, inconsistent representations would lead to triviality, in that everything could be derived from such representations. Hence, they fail as representations, since in representing everything they fail to represent anything in particular.
One counter-response would be to adopt one of many formal frameworks capable of accommodating inconsistency. Even those accounts that privilege denotation, such as those developed in (Goodman [1976] ) or, more recently (Hughes [1997] , [2010] ), could accommodate such examples, through an appeal to some notion of denotation appropriate for inconsistent contexts, which would be related to the various forms of paraconsistent logic that are widely available.
8 Alternatively, one could insist that putative examples of such representations apparently exist in both science and art, and therefore require analysis. In the case of inconsistent representations in art, they may be handled by Budd's approach, as we have just indicated. In the case of science, one could accommodate such cases within the model-theoretic approach, as indicated in (da Costa and French [2003] ). That takes us on to the second of the above views (option (b) above). On this view, inconsistent representations, although possible, are never true. Hence, we are not committed to the existence of inconsistent objects. This is the view we favour with such representations being regarded as quasi-true only. The central idea is as follows: Bohr's theory contains elements of both quantum and classical physics and if we were to focus on each element to the exclusion of the other, we might be tempted to say the theory represents a quantum or classical system, respectively. However, this would be to ignore what effectively 'binds' the theory into a whole and allows the two disparate elements to co-exist, as it were, and that is Bohr's central notion of a 'stationary state'. It is here that the two contradictory elements come together: classical mechanics applies to the dynamics of the electron in the stationary state, while quantum theory comes in when the transition between such states is considered. However, it is important to note that it is not only in the discreteness of the stationary states that we have conflict between quantum and classical physics but also in what has been called 'one of the most audacious postulates ever seen in physics' (Pais [1991] , p. 147), namely the assertion that the ground state is stable, so that an electron in such a state will not radiate energy and spiral into the nucleus as determined by classical physics. This is the central inconsistency of the Bohr model and together with their discrete nature it is what makes the stationary states so peculiar. Nevertheless, we would insist again that there is no corresponding inconsistent object, given that we don't take the model to be true, and neither did physicists at the time, which in effect undermines option (a) above (for further details, see da Costa and French [2003] ).
Of course, as the Bohr model evolved and came to be supplanted, this peculiarity was eventually understood in terms of the new quantum mechanics and as a consequence the formal inconsistency evaporated-or, better, came to be replaced by interpretational incongruencies associated with waveparticle duality, for example, which the principle of complementarity was intended to resolve (see da Costa and French [2003] ). At the time the model was proposed, however, the notion of a stationary state was not understood at all, or at best, only partially, and if one were to represent Bohr's theory in terms of partial structures, the stationary states would have to be located among the R 3 components, as relationships which had not yet been established to hold or not for those particular elements of the domain, namely atoms. As quantum theory developed, this notion came to be better understood-in particular in terms of the eigenstate of the relevant Hamiltonian-and it can be thought of as shifting from the R 3 component in one partial structure (corresponding to Bohr's theory) to the R 1 component of another (corresponding to the new quantum mechanics of the mid-1920s). By 1926, the concept of a stationary state came to be formulated in a mathematically precise way, and it is this stationary state, more precisely understood, that was ultimately incorporated into the new quantum theory. Of course, something was lost along the way, most notably Bohr's notion of well-defined circular electronic orbits, which are components that were not mapped into the new quantum theory via any partial morphism.
What we place in the R 1 -, R 2 -or R 3 -components is, of course, decided in retrospect, since we are characterizing the theories from the point of view of a philosophical understanding of science. From this point of view, we take it that one of the jobs of the philosopher of science is to appropriately characterize theories in order to enable the relevant philosophical investigation. Not surprisingly, different philosophical views may highlight different features of scientific practice, and disagreements about the importance of the chosen features may emerge. The point is that by characterizing the theories in the way we have indicated above, one can accommodate the partial and conceptually 'blurred' understanding of the stationary state in Bohr's theory that allows for a certain internal 'looseness of fit' between the component elements of that theory. And this, in turn, gives us an idea of how the theory can still be said to represent: what it represents are atoms, but it does so in terms of elements that incorporate aspects of classical and of quantum physics and has at its heart this poorly understood and conceptually indistinct notion of stationary state.
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From a realist stance, one can adopt options (a), (b) or (c) above to make sense of this case. Under option (a), the atoms would indeed be taken to possess inconsistent properties. Under option (c) the conceptual content of Bohr's theory is clarified in such a way as to remove the putative inconsistency. Under option (b), which of course we advocate, the theory is regarded as quasi-true (since of course it was successful), but this does not imply that it represents an actually existing inconsistent object. Within this framework, and recalling our earlier characterization of quasi-truth, both the relevant features of classical electrodynamics and the infamous quantum jumps can each be regarded as elements of strong sub-theories of Bohr's theory in the sense defined above. Thus, Bohr's theory, being weakly quasi-true (but not true simpliciter!), is a significant instance of an inconsistent representation in science. Note that this option is also available for an empiricist who does not take scientific theories to be true, but empirically adequate only.
There is also here a suggestive parallel with Budd's framework: if we focus on, or abstract out, the classical and quantum aspects of Bohr's model, then each can be taken to represent, respectively, classical and quantum objects. It is when these aspects are brought together and we wonder what the model as a whole represents that we experience a kind of cognitive tension akin to the visual discomfort we encounter when we look at one of Escher's drawings, or the trident illusion. The tension arises precisely because in either case we are forced to flip between incompatible aspects of the representation. Clearly, however, no objects corresponding to these inconsistent representations exist.
Thus, think of Escher's famous waterfall drawing. There we have two sets of mappings: one from the world to the surface of the drawing, and another from the surface of the drawing to the visual field. Focusing first on the relation between the world and the surface of the drawing, note that in so far as no existing physical waterfalls can possibly instantiate the arrangements depicted in the drawing, the latter carries more information than the former. In that sense, any mapping from the world to the surface of the drawing will lose some information. However, any waterfall in the world is a three-dimensional object, and Escher's waterfall drawing is only a two-dimensional construct. In that sense, some information is lost when the former is mapped into the latter. Of course, by using a suitable perspective, that information can be recaptured, thus producing the illusion of a three-dimensional scene on a two-dimensional surface. Thus, we don't have here a simple case of informational gain or loss. Informativeness is a context-dependent notion, and depending on the features we are attending to, certain mappings may entail information loss and others information gain. Given the partiality of information involved, capturing such mappings in terms of partial morphisms seems the most appropriate way forward.
Escher's drawing creates the illusion of an inconsistent waterfall because certain elements in the painting do 'double duty': for example, consider some of the pillars supporting the aqueduct in the drawing. At one end, they rest in the inner wall of the aqueduct, but at the other end they support the outer wall. Also, close examination reveals certain arches that vanish into thin air (see, for example, the front arch at the bottom of the right-hand side column). Clearly, Escher violates here the coding conventions of perspectival drawing. Part of Escher's brilliance lay in discouraging us from examining closely these aspects of the work, thereby maintaining the illusion that it represents an inconsistent object.
When it comes to the mappings between the drawing and the visual field, there we have no loss of information and, as Budd emphasizes, an isomorphic relationship is established.
Likewise, we can perhaps think of the notion of a stationary state in Bohr's theory as doing 'double duty' in being understood in both classical and quantum terms. Indeed, we can think of Bohr's brilliance in terms of tinkering with the conventional understanding of stationary state, so as to preserve the 'illusion' of an entire theory or model that was in fact inconsistent. In the case of Escher, the cognitive dissonance arises when one attempts to apply the afore-mentioned coding conventions to the whole drawing; similarly in Bohr's case, as long as one derives results from only selected parts of the theory, collapse into triviality is avoided, but not if one takes the theory as a whole, as an entire object as it were. The way in which parts of Bohr's theory, and parts of the predecessor theories such as Maxwell's, can be used in obtaining the relevant derivations can both be captured via partial isomorphisms.
Here we see how morphism-based approaches can accommodate apparently inconsistent representations in both art and science. Of course, some care must be taken in drawing such parallels. In the Bohr case, the cognitive discomfort was eventually assuaged-or, perhaps, merely transposed to the level of interpretation-through the introduction of a formally consistent theory. But no such developments can, or should, be expected in the case of Escher's work. This reflects one difference between scientific representations and artworks.
Furthermore, an inconsistent body of claims can still be weakly quasi-true, in the formal sense noted above. Thus representations containing inconsistencies can themselves be weakly quasi-true, in the sense that some of its strong consistent sub-theories are quasi-true, where a strong sub-theory involves being included in a larger theory and being empirically adequate, explanatory, and formulated via principles that are logically interconnected (i.e. possessing all the usual and interesting pragmatic features). Far from being an absurdity, then, this is an important feature of our account that is not reflected in the alternatives. In particular, our account does not require-in fact, it rules out-that contradictions (statements of the form 'A and not-A') be quasi-true. Instead, when dealing with inconsistent theories the notion of weak quasi-truth is enough: this notion allows us to highlight the features of some parts of inconsistent theories that have been successful without requiring the truth of the whole.
We thereby avoid the sort of dialetheic vision advocated by Priest ([2006] ), where some inconsistencies are true simpliciter. As da Costa and French ([2003] ) make clear, the quasi-truth approach accommodates the transitional nature of such inconsistencies as heuristic forces propel scientists to find consistent successors. (This is, again, something that does not typically feature in art, where the cognitive dissonance generated by the apparent contradictory state of affairs is in some cases part of the aim of the work.)
Turning now to option (c) above, the basis for such accounts that lie behind options (a) and (b) has recently been questioned on essentially ontological grounds in the sense that it is claimed that theories should not be regarded as the sorts of things that have absolutely determinable content: the content is attributed to them by putting together appropriate statements associated with what is regarded as the theory, but which statements are put together ultimately depends on context (Vickers [2008] , [2009] ). And when it comes to putatively inconsistent theories, one can attribute content in such a way that no explicit inconsistency arises. In the case of Bohr, it is asserted that he drew on only part of the classical theory of electromagnetism, namely that part that covered electrostatics rather than the full electrodynamics, and hence although his theory may have been inconsistent with Maxwell's, it was not internally inconsistent. Now, we shall not enter here into the details of this view. What is important for us is the claim that, depending on the context, or more specifically the particular investigation one is undertaking, theoretical assumptions can be put together in fundamentally different ways (Vickers [2009] we don't need separate theories of representation to account for artistic representation, linguistic representation, scientific representation, culinary representation, and so on, but rather [we claim] that all these sorts of representation can be explained (in a unified way) as deriving from some more fundamental sorts of representations, which are typically taken to be mental states. (Callendar and Cohen [2006] , p. 7)
Since representation via mental states can then be described on independent grounds, the need for an account of scientific representation-such as that offered by partial structures-is eliminated. The heart of their strategy consists in the claim that the 'vehicle' of representation represents the 'target' of the representation in virtue of the fact that the vehicle produces (in the mind of the relevant person) a mental state with 10 If one thinks of theories ontologically as objects that are taken to stand in the representational relationship with the relevant system or phenomena, then they may be understood in different ways. Theories may be understood as indeterminate objects, in a fundamentally ontological sense, since they are not determinately delineated. More radically, they may be regarded as not existing as an object prior to the relevant theoretical assumptions being 'put together' as suggested above.
the appropriate content. Which state is produced, and hence which target is represented, is ultimately, for Callendar and Cohen, a matter of stipulation, although in practice some vehicles turn out to be more convenient to use than others. So, Bohr, for example, could have chosen a Manchester tart to represent the atom, but instead chose the particular model he did as it was simply more convenient for creating the appropriate mental state in the minds of his intended audience or readership. Thus the choice of models, and in particular the choice of scientific models, comes down to a matter of pragmatics (where this may include empirical factors). Now this is a bold account, particularly in the context of the debate regarding scientific representation, but whatever the merits of such a reductionist move, one can easily see how it glosses over precisely the sorts of differences between forms of representation that we might be interested in when we consider scientific theories and models. Such differences were noted by Peirce, among others, who distinguished between three kinds of relation between representations and what they represent, corresponding to three kinds of signs: the iconic, in which the representation 'resembles', in some sense, the represented object (such as works of art, diagrams, and scientific theories); the indexical, in which the representation is caused by the represented object (examples include barometers, the symptoms of disease), and the symbolic, for which the relationship is stipulative (as in Western European languages). Callendar and Cohen seem intent on collapsing all forms of representation into the last but, not surprisingly, that leads them to trouble, as when they present a road sign warning as a putative counter-example to the isomorphism account we shall be defending here. Whereas the former can indeed be regarded as a stipulation determined by convention, the differences between that and, say, Holbein's The Ambassadors, or Bohr's model of the atom-differences which Peirce and others express through the distinctions noted aboveare so striking as to function as part of a reductio argument against any view which fails to appreciate them. (Which is not to say that either The Ambassadors or Bohr's model do not contain some elements of convention; but we'll return to that shortly.)
And, indeed, as Contessa ([2007] ) notes, they give the game away by acknowledging (as we have pointed out above) that in many cases our choice of a particular vehicle of representation cannot purely be a matter of stipulation as this choice is underpinned by considerations of convenience which in turn depend on an appropriate relationship holding between the vehicle and the target. Consider the example of conventionalism with regard to geometry and space-time physics. For Poincaré, it was a matter of convention whether to use Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry. Of course, he chose the former on grounds of simplicity, but in both cases an appropriate relationship had first to be established between the geometry and the phenomena being represented.
11 Hence, it was not just a matter of stipulation, which, in this respect, is typical of cases of scientific representation. Callendar and Cohen themselves note that it is more convenient to use an upturned right hand to represent the state of Michigan than a saltshaker because of the relevant geometric similarity. But then our preferences reveal something fundamental about the mechanism of representation-which incorporates the relevant relationship-in such cases. Callendar and Cohen's reductionism effectively skips over this and leaves us none the wiser as to how either artworks or theories function as representational devices. The bottom line is that within the category of what Peirce referred to as iconic representations there appear to be differences between works of art and scientific theories, which bear on the issue of the nature of the representational relationship and that is what we are interested in, rather than some reductionist move which is too coarse grained to allow us to analyse such differences. Contessa ([2007] ) uses his criticism of Callendar and Cohen as a springboard to 'disentangle' mere denotation from what he calls 'successful epistemic representation' where the latter involves 'correct surrogative reasoning' (see Swoyer [1991] ) by which one uses the vehicle of representation to learn about the target. Such reasoning is valid only if it is in accordance with a set of rules which supply an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target.
12
According to Contessa, it is only when a user adopts such an interpretation that we have a representation.
There is much that we agree with in Contessa's account and which can be adapted to ours. Interestingly, he uses as a mini-case study a comparison of Rutherford's model of the atom with Thomson's 'plum pudding' model, where the latter can be regarded as an unsuccessful representation since it generated a false conclusion about the atom (the Rutherford model allows us to infer that the kind of scattering observed by Geiger and Marsden would occur; the Thomson model does not). The Thomson model misrepresents the atom, whereas the Rutherford construct is more successful. Contessa's point is that both could be taken to denote the atom but it is only the latter that constitutes a 'successful epistemic representation' since it incorporated correct surrogative reasoning (with regard to the scattering phenomenon, for example).
We shall discuss misrepresentation below, but it is worth noting that Rutherford's model was not completely successful, of course. In this regard, it is perhaps significant that Contessa does not continue the history and introduce the model that was taken to be even more successful than Rutherford's, namely Bohr's. As we have seen, even inconsistent representations can be 11 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point. 12 The rules in question need not be explicit; as is well known, rule-following is notoriously problematic.
handled by the partial structures approach, a claim that Callendar and Cohen seem to treat as constituting a form of reductio of the whole position. However, contrary to what they claim, it is not the fact of inconsistency that drives us, in desperation, to partial isomorphisms. Rather, having constructed the partial structures account, it counts in its favour that as well as accommodating more straightforward cases, it can also handle inconsistent theories. Let us consider in particular Callendar and Cohen's worry that any account of representation must distinguish between coherent and incoherent putative representations. Inconsistent representations may then be seen as examples of the latter and therefore any account that accommodates inconsistency will fail to make the necessary distinction. This is not correct, however. If we take the practice of science seriously then we need to be able to accommodate putative examples of inconsistent theories that arise in the history of science. Of course, it may turn out that in these cases the theories are not actually inconsistent, corresponding to option (c), above (see Section 5). As we have indicated, we can accommodate such examples-ultimately they don't involve any inconsistency. However, if the theories are in fact inconsistent, the partial structures framework allows us to accommodate them, using the notion of weak quasi-truth. Furthermore, we can also distinguish inconsistent and incoherent representations. An inconsistent representation (one from which a contradiction of the form 'A and not-A' follows) can be coherent as long as it is not made trivial by the resulting inconsistency, that is, as long as not everything follows from the latter. The possibility of inconsistent but non-trivial representations emerges from the fact that the underlying logic of the partial structures account is paraconsistent (see da Costa et al. [1998] ). And if the inconsistent representations in question turn out to be explanatory, empirically adequate, and formulated via principles that are logically interconnected, such representations can be considered coherent, despite their inconsistency.
Consider another example, that of quantum gravity. Here the inconsistency between quantum mechanics (QM) and general relativity (GR) doesn't prevent scientists from working on the unification of the two, in the hopes of obtaining a consistent successor. Part of the project, at least as articulated by one of the main contenders for a theory of quantum gravity, namely, loop quantum gravity, consists in developing a new framework from which, under suitable circumstances, particular features from QM and from GR can be replicated. Central to this project is a discrete quantum space-time on the basis of which certain constructions can be made and from those one can reproduce 'the physics of quantum fields and linearized gravitational waves' (Smolin [2006] , p. 214). In developing this emerging theory, only appropriate parts of QM and GR are reproduced, since it is recognized that neither represent absolutely everything; in particular, and perhaps contentiously, the 'background structure' currently assumed may be dropped in the new theory (see French and Rickles [2006] ). Note that loop quantum gravity can be regarded as weakly quasi-true, since we have the strong sub-theories of QM and GR each of which are quasi-true; 13 in the case of QM, an example of what is taken as quasi-true are those sentences referring to Fock spaces. (Regarding QM and GR as only quasi-true seems appropriate given the point noted above that, in this case, such theories will not be taken over into their unified successor tout court.) Of course, new theoretical terms will be introduced, such as those referring to discrete quantum space-time, for example. And as just sketched, the resulting theoretical framework can still be regarded as quasi-true. Thus, we see it as an advantage of our approach that it can handle even those representations that emerge in times of theory transition. Let us now move on to more general criticisms of isomorphism-based accounts.
From Art to Science
In criticizing certain formal accounts of scientific representation, including the one we advocate here, Suárez has deployed a range of examples from the art world (Suárez [1999] ). We shall examine these in detail below, but the central claim is that such examples (purportedly) undermine the role of isomorphism as an element of the mechanism of representation in science. These examples and the associated claim raise important issues about the extent to which representation in art and science can be compared.
There are two obvious responses one can make to this kind of argument. The first was canvassed in (French [2003] ), but we shall return to it here in order to emphasize the nature of the dialectic in this case. This response refers to accounts of representation in art, from the philosophy of art itself, that involve formal relationships such as isomorphisms and the like, such as Budd's outlined above. If such accounts are successful, then Suárez's rejection of such formal relationships is undermined. Let us be clear: we are not claiming that Budd's account of representation in art can be straightforwardly applied to representation in science. We are only claiming that the very nature of Budd's proposal undermines Suárez's claim that isomorphism-based accounts are not appropriate for artworks. Moreover, there are suggestive 13 Strictly speaking, the conjunction of the principles of QM and GR is not quasi-true, given the resulting inconsistency; at best, such a conjunction is weakly quasi-true. However, taken separately, each of these theories is quasi-true (in a given partial structure A), since there are suitable A-normal structures that extend the partial structure in question in which these theories are true. Note that an A-normal structure need not be a universal structure in the sense that it covers every possible aspect of the universe. The assessment of the truth of a theory in a structure is, of course, always domain specific, since it is implemented relative to the components of the structure (namely, the objects in the latter's domain and the relations among such objects). parallels between Budd's view and ours by virtue of their formal similarities, some of which we have explored above. The parallels suggest that a unitary account of representation in science and art may be possible, and this article may be seen as laying the groundwork for that.
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The second response to Suárez's argument is to simply dismiss all the examples drawn from art as irrelevant for the issue we are concerned with. This has obvious implications for a unitary account of representation, spanning both art and science. We shall consider this response below.
So, with regard to the first response and just to drive the point home: the initial claim is that representation in science may be captured by accounts involving formal relationships such as isomorphisms holding between the relevant structures. Suárez has countered this by offering examples of art works where either there can be no isomorphism (strictly understood) that can hold between the painting and what it is taken to represent, or where the 'point' of the artwork does not supervene on its representational capacity. However, accounts of representation in art, such as Budd's, that involve formal relationships such as isomorphisms and the like, undermine this criticism.
The point here is to show that even restricting examples to those from the world of art, and looking at accounts of representation within the philosophy of art, one may still find isomorphism-based frameworks that encompass the kinds of cases that Suárez and others find problematic. Thus, such frameworks cannot be dismissed so easily on the basis of such cases. As a result, there is a little more to the point than simply appealing to aesthetics in order to 'elaborate' upon a formal account, as Downes puts it ([2009] , p. 418; see also p. 423). Indeed, French also expressed concern about the use of examples from art to undermine or falsify claims about representation in science, an issue to which we shall return shortly. More importantly however, and drawing on Lopes ([1996] ), Downes argues against such formal accounts in general: we need more than isomorphism in such cases; we need some knowledge of what it is that the picture depicts. Lopes presents this as a challenge: 'does visual field similarity in fact explain how we experience pictures as like their subjects, independent of knowledge of what they depict?' ([1996] , p. 23). Downes argues that the same challenge applies to Budd, and hence by extension to partial isomorphism accounts, and insists that it cannot be met.
We need to get clear on the precise nature of the challenge. In fact, as Downes acknowledges, Lopes focuses on Peacocke's account of picturing, in which the representational relationship is described in terms of 'F-relatedness': 'Something is F-related to an object only if it is presented in a region of the visual field which is experienced as similar in shape to a region in which the object could be presented when seen from some point of view' (Lopes [1996] , p. 22). Downes takes this to be 'strikingly similar' to Budd's account, not least because according to it, when we 'experience' a painting we experience its visual field properties. However, in order for this account to work, these visual field properties need to be associated with the relevant features of the painting. Obviously, that association needs to be established on independent grounds in order for it to be adequate. However, it is claimed that the account fails precisely because we have no such independent grounds for ascribing the same properties to the intermediary visual field and what it stands for (Lopes [1996] , p. 23). As Lopes goes on to insist, what would provide such independent grounds are the relevant rules of optical projection, such as Alberti's rule, which dictates that a picture should be seen as a transparent surface on which the outlines of objects seen through it may be inscribed (Lopes [1996] , p. 24). With such rules in operation, Peacocke's F-relation holds (because in effect the definition of the visual field and the rule for drawing in perspective are identical). However, those pictures that are not produced in accordance with such rules will not satisfy the F-relation. Those that involve projections onto interposed planes that are not perpendicular to the line of sight between artist and subject-such as The Ambassadors-will conform to the F-condition only under special conditions; and those such as the trident illusion (and presumably Escher's drawings) are simply not explicable via F-relatedness at all (Lopes [1996] , p. 27).
Extended as a criticism of Budd's account, this seems odd, given that the latter explicitly claims to be able to accommodate The Ambassadors and the impossible trident. Of course, Budd does not adhere to Peacocke's F-relatedness and here there is no similarity, striking or otherwise. His account is much broader than that, not least in that it allows for the visual field experience of the painting's surface to be strikingly unlike the relevant state of affairs in possessing features that the latter does not or vice versa (this is what suggests that Budd's account should more properly be viewed as involving partial isomorphism). More importantly, he makes it clear that when experiencing a painting, 'you must see the structure of the surface as being isomorphic with the structure of the visual field representation of the picture's subject when seen from a certain point of view' (Budd [1993] , p. 161; emphasis added).
15 That 'point of view' will then embody the relevant rule that allows the viewer to appropriately interpret the painting-in the case of The Ambassadors this is relatively straightforward; in that of the impossible trident, perhaps less so-and provides the independent ground required for the above explanation. Thus, Lopes' challenge can be met within the philosophy of art, it would seem. However, there is a more important issue here, when it comes to scientific representation. In that case what would provide the relevant independent grounds that would underpin the ascription of the same properties to the visual intermediary and the system? Obviously, we cannot expect anything like Alberti's rule to operate here but when it comes to observable entities and systems, at least, there are corresponding rules-embodied in our understanding (partly, if not considerably, theoretical) of the relevant apparatus and instruments-that precisely underpin such an ascription. In certain cases, such as that of the optical microscope, perhaps, the relevant rules will be comparatively straightforward. As the level of instrumental complexity increases, with a corresponding increase in the theoretical component of our understanding of the instrument concerned, so the rules, if they can be called such, become correspondingly more complex. 16 Thus, in the case of images of systems at the nanoscale, for example, a theoretical image may be produced, corresponding to what is thought to be going on and that is used to guide the development of the experiment (Bueno [2008] ). In such cases, the empirical image produced by the instrument, such as a scanning tunnelling microscope, may be experienced as resembling this theoretical image and the relevant inference of similarity made between the former and the sample under examination:
Partial mappings between the theoretical image and the empirical image can be explicitly identified, given that researchers have direct access to both sorts of images. Given the partial mappings, researchers then infer that there is a corresponding match between the empirical image and the sample. (Bueno [2008], p. 135) In the case of representations of unobservable objects, the situation is different, of course. Here it is difficult to avoid entering the realism-antirealism debate as the relevant grounds for ascribing the same properties to the elements of the representation as are supposedly possessed by the system will have to do with the No Miracles Argument, however that is understood. We shall not pursue this further because at this point Lopes' account of depiction appears to be an entirely inappropriate basis for claims about scientific representation of such unobservable systems-as indeed does Budd's. At this point, perhaps one could respond by saying 'so much for Budd (and Lopes) '. This was just an example, within the on-going dialectic, to show how even in art 16 We are using 'rules' as a catch-all term for a whole complex of theoretical, experimental, design principles, rules of thumb, and so forth.
partial isomorphism may find a place, and there was no suggestion that such visual fields and the associated rules of perspective etc. play a role with regard to representation in science in general.
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This brings us to our second response advertised above: one could dismiss all the examples drawn from art as irrelevant for the consideration of representation in science. After all, what do paintings-in particular those that are given as counter-examples to our approach, which are drawn from abstract art-really have to do with scientific representations? Here one must tread a little carefully. Certainly we can see the plausibility in denying that such examples could act as falsifying instances of isomorphism-based accounts of representation in science. One could, for example, insist that such accounts are entirely different from those applicable to artworks and that, in effect, a sui generis framework must be developed. This would obviously mean giving up on the idea of a unitary account of representation across multiple domains. Or one could argue that the relevant characteristics of the examples from art on which their apparently falsifying power depends do not translate over to the equivalent examples in science.
However, there are sufficient similarities to suggest that we should not give up so quickly. After all, there are cases of high level, and highly mathematised, scientific representations that can be taken to represent more than one kind of system, by analogy with the purported counter-examples to be discussed below. There are others that can be understood as representing the relevant structural features of the system, just as certain kinds of abstract art can be said to represent structure. And as we have seen it has been claimed that there are even cases of apparently contradictory representations in science, similar to those of the impossible trident or the works of Escher. Of course, this does not imply the existence of inconsistent objects, as we have indicated, if one adopts options (b) or (c) (as discussed in Section 5), where we recall that (b) explicitly incorporates partial structures and partial morphisms. However, even if there are no such internally inconsistent representations, as Vickers ([2008] , [2009] ) claims, the relevant relationships that he indicates can be captured via partial morphisms as we have noted.
As should be clear, our aim in this article is to offer the partial structures account as a broad approach to representation in science. Having responded to the general set of concerns above, let us now turn our attention to the more specific counter-examples mentioned above. Specific criticisms of isomorphism-based accounts of representation range from concerns about the 'ontology' of representation, to concerns about mis-representation (Frigg [2006] ; Suárez [1999] , [2003] ). We shall present each in turn before developing our responses.
Challenges to the Formal Account

Necessity
Perhaps the most well-known criticism proceeds from the argument that neither isomorphism, nor similarity in general, can be necessary for representation, since the latter may occur without any relevant similarities, or isomorphisms, being in place. If we agree that anything is similar to anything else in certain respects, then some 'criterion of relevance' (Suárez [2003] , p. 235) is needed to identify the similarities that are meant to constitute representation. Relevance, of course, is not an intuitive notion, so it has been argued that in Picasso's Guernica, for example, none of the similarities that can be seen-'a bull, a crying mother holding up a baby, an enormous eye' (Suárez [2003] , p. 236)-appear to be directly relevant to the targets of the representation, which can be identified with the bombing of Guernica and, more abstractly, the rising threat of fascism in Europe. The same is true, it is claimed, of an equation representing a system, where the marks on a piece of paper have no relevant similarity with the system being represented.
More specifically, it is argued, isomorphism cannot be necessary for representation since there exist examples of artworks that cannot be held to be isomorphic to anything (Suárez [1999] ). In the case of Guernica, again, it can be argued that it is ambiguous regarding precisely what the painting represents: on the one hand, it represents the 'concrete pain' of the inhabitants of Guernica, but on the other it also represents the 'more abstract threat' noted above. Hence, it has been argued that it cannot stand in any one-to-one correspondence with (and thus be related via isomorphism to) those things that it is taken to represent (Suárez [1999] , p. 78). Another example is that of the work of Mondrian, and it is suggested that to focus on representation in such cases is to miss the point of the art in that the aesthetic and emotive responses that this type of abstract painting induces do not arise in virtue of its 'representing' anything (Suárez [1999] , p. 79).
Sufficiency
Even in cases where there is a relevant similarity, or isomorphism, it is claimed that representation may nonetheless fail to hold. Suárez urges that for A to represent B, A must lead an 'informed and competent' enquirer to consider B ([2003], p. 237), so there exists an 'essential directionality of representation'. Given that similarity and isomorphism are logically symmetric, it is argued, they cannot explain how 'consideration of the target [leads] to consideration of the source' (Suárez [2003] , p. 236). Hence, isomorphism-based accounts are insufficient for representation.
Logic
Relatedly, and following Goodman's ([1976] ) work on depiction, similarity and isomorphism are both symmetric and reflexive: 'a glass of water [for example] is similar to itself, and similar to any other glass that is similar to it' (Suárez [2003] , p. 233). Representation, on the other hand, does not share these properties. Even if 'an equation represents a phenomenon, the phenomenon cannot be said to stand for the equation' (Suárez [2003] , p. 232), and likewise, we would not claim that the phenomenon represented itself.
18 These concerns then lead into the next.
Mechanism
This derives from the fundamental question: how do models or structures in general, represent their targets? (Frigg [2006] calls this the 'enigma of representation'.) Thus, the further worry is that since isomorphisms only hold between structures, we must assume that the target 'exhibits' the relevant structure, and this will involve a descriptive element that renders the representational relation not wholly structural. Furthermore, depending on which description we choose, the target system will exhibit different non-isomorphic structures. Thus, consider the example of the shape of the methane molecule, for instance (Frigg [2006] ). It has been argued that depending on whether we take the vertices as objects and the edges as relations or vice versa, we get two different structures: 'The upshot of this is that methane exemplifies a certain structure only with respect to a certain description and that there is no such thing as the structure of methane. And this is by no means a peculiarity of this example' (Frigg [2006] , p. 58).
Style
Here, the concern is whether there are any constraints on the choice of style of representation in science (which Frigg [2006] calls the 'problem of style'). It is claimed that the emphasis that proponents of structuralist accounts of representation put on isomorphism suggests that they adopt the normative view that representation must be understood in these terms. But, it is then argued, this is implausible since many representations are inaccurate in various ways (e.g. through idealizations) and also because of the possibility of misrepresentation, neither of which the isomorphism account can handle (Frigg [2006] ). Curiously, perhaps, it is asserted that the same holds for amended versions of the isomorphism account, such as ours, even thoughgiven our emphasis on the partiality of information-that patently seems not to be the case. We shall return to this shortly.
Misrepresentation
Here it is argued that similarity and isomorphism cannot account for the two types of misrepresentation that are encountered in practice, namely mistargeting and inaccuracy. In the case of mistargeting, consider the following example from art, that of Velázquez's painting of Pope Innocent X. Clearly the painting represents the Pope. Now, suppose that a friend were to disguise himself to look like the Pope (Suárez [2003] ). Then, upon seeing the canvass, we might mistakenly suppose it to represent the friend. Neither similarity nor isomorphism-based accounts can account for this misrepresentation, as there are still relations of similarity, or isomorphisms, holding between the canvass and the friend. With regard to inaccuracy, consider the example of Newtonian mechanics used as a representation of the solar system. Here it is claimed that a similarity formulation cannot account for the fact that 'without general relativistic corrections, [Newtonian mechanics] can at best provide an approximately correct representation of the solar system' (Suárez [2003] , p. 235); that is, it does not account for the quantitative differences between theory and experiment. It seems that what is being asked for here is a theory of representation which not only accounts for the respects in which the model is similar to the system it represents, but also defines the respects in which, and more importantly the extent to which, it is dissimilar. Thus, 'the interesting question is not what properties fail to obtain, but rather how far is the divergence between the predictions and the observations regarding the values of the properties that do obtain' (Suárez [2003] , p. 235).
Ontology
This concern has to do with the issue of the ontological nature of the representational devices we are considering and it is alleged that structure-based accounts such as ours are deficient in two respects. First, it is argued that as a result of the above, and in particular of those concerns we have labelled 'mechanism' and 'style' (but to which we might also add 'necessity' and 'sufficiency'), the ontology of such devices, particularly if they are taken to be models, cannot be structural (Frigg [2006] ).
Secondly, it is argued that the variety of such representational devices that we find in practice precludes their accommodation within the kind of account we favour. Thus, consider the following cases: an engineer's toy bridge representing a real bridge, a graph of a bridge again representing a real bridge, a billiard ball model representing the dynamical properties of a gas, and a quantum state diffusion equation, which represents the quantum state of a particle undergoing diffusion. It is not clear where either similarity or isomorphism enters into the account of how such a plethora of cases represents (Suárez [2003] ).
Let us now consider how the partial structures account might respond to these concerns.
9 The Formal Account Defended 9.1 Preamble: 'informational' versus 'functional' accounts As Chakravartty ([2009] ) emphasizes, the apparent dichotomy between the kind of account we favour-which he calls 'informational'-and that which is advocated by others, such as Suárez-which he designates as 'functional'-may in fact only be a confusion of means with ends, in the sense that the former is concerned with what scientific representations are, and the latter has the issue of what we do with them as its focus. 19 We do not dispute that the latter is a fundamentally significant issue and agree in fact that an important role for models in science is to allow scientists to perform the kind of 'surrogative' reasoning emphasized by Swoyer, for example. Indeed, we would claim that representing the 'surrogative' nature of this reasoning effectively rides on the back of the relevant partial isomorphisms, since it is through these that we can straightforwardly capture the kinds of idealizations, abstractions, and inconsistencies that we find in scientific models. Thus, Bueno and Colyvan ([forthcoming] ) have adapted (in another context) Hughes' account (Hughes [1997] , [2010] ) to do precisely this. We recall that according to Hughes, scientific representation is a matter of denotation, demonstration, and interpretation (DDI). In particular, a model stands for, or refers to, a physical system, and elements of the model denote elements of that system. Through the 'internal dynamics' of the model, we 'demonstrate' the relevant results (yielding novel predictions and the like). These results that are demonstrated within the model then have to be interpreted in terms of its subject, and we can determine whether our theoretical conclusions correspond 19 Of course, one could define what representations are in terms of what we do with them. This formulation of the 'functional' account of representation makes no room for any informational element. And given that representation does seem to have both informational and functional features, Chakravartty's distinction highlights an important point that is worth preserving.
to the phenomena, or not. In fact, although it may be true in the world of art that almost anything may stand for anything else, this is not the case in science: not anything can serve as a scientific model of a physical system since if the appropriate relationships are not in place between the relevant properties, then the 'model' will not be deemed scientific to begin with (French [2003] ). Bueno and Colyvan ([forthcoming] ) overcome this concern by replacing denotation with what they call 'immersion', by which a mapping is established between the empirical set-up and the representational structure. In the situation we are considering here, this would be given in terms of partial isomorphisms. 20 This stage is hence explicitly 'informational' in Chakravartty's terms, given that there is information transfer from the empirical set-up to the (mathematical) model. Consequences are then drawn using the representational structure, in a stage Bueno and Colyvan call 'derivation', and it is here that the 'functional' role of the representation is exemplified, given that the model is used in order to derive particular results. The final step is interpretation, taking the results of the derivation stage back to the target system via another mapping (which may be different from the first), which is given in terms of partial isomorphisms (or some other suitable mapping). The focus here is, once again, on the 'informational' aspect, given the reverse information transfer from the (mathematical) model, suitably interpreted, to the empirical set-up. This three-stage framework thus explicitly brings the 'informational' and 'functional' approaches together, in a way that satisfies Chakravartty's suggestion. However, it crucially depends on the relevant mappings being established. For the cases under consideration here (i.e. scientific theories and models and the systems they represent), such mappings are best articulated via partial isomorphisms (or partial homomorphisms).
The crucial point, as should now be clear, is that to base one's account of representation on surrogative reasoning or inferences without accepting the underlying formal aspects is, as Chakravartty notes, to engage in a confusion. Indeed, we would go further and insist that such a move makes no sense: it is only within some account of the formal relationships involved that we can understand how the relevant reasoning can be appropriately surrogative.
Furthermore, the above criticisms of informational accounts are less than decisive. Let us consider them now.
Necessity
First of all, and related to the above point, Chakravartty points out that it cannot be the case that similarity in general is not necessary for scientific 20 But other kinds of morphisms, such as partial homomorphism, can be-and often are-invoked (see, e.g. Bueno et al. [2002] ).
representation, since in the absence of such, the successful facilitation of the usual practices of interpretation and inference-subsequently characterized by Bueno and Colyvan's ([forthcoming] ) account, for example-would be nothing short of a miracle. Here, it is the requirement that such facilitation be accommodated that effectively demands that there be some relation of similarity that holds between the representational device and the target system. Moreover, this relation must be such as to permit the appropriate inferences without which it would be hard to talk about scientific representation in the first place. The relevant mapping involved will typically be such as to map parts of the particular empirical set-up into the model and vice versa (in accordance with the inferential conception, for instance). Elsewhere we have argued that partial isomorphism and homomorphism offer an especially appropriate way of characterizing this relation, in the scientific context (see Bueno [1997] ; Bueno et al. [2002] ; da Costa and French [2003] ). It is with regard to the above requirement that scientific representation differs from the artistic (at least insofar as it is not one of the primary aims of artistic representations to facilitate interpretation and inference) and hence putative counter-examples such as Guernica lose their force. It should be noted, however, that there has to be some partial isomorphism between the marks on the canvass and specific objects in the world in order for our understanding of what Guernica represents to get off the ground. That understanding may vary with our historical, political, and social sensibilities, but the basic mechanism of representation involves the kinds of relations we have highlighted here. In cases such as this, these sensibilities drive the symbolic dimension of the artistic representation, but in the sense in which this dimension is understood in art, it is not as central to science. Symbolic representations may play a heuristic role in science, but when it comes to the practices of interpretation and inference touched on above, the relevant work is done by the underlying mechanism of representation (the various types of morphisms).
Logic and sufficiency
With regard to the 'logical' objection, partial isomorphism is an equivalence relation if we consider only two (partial) structures, but not if we consider the domain as a whole, where other factors break the symmetry. These other factors are broadly pragmatic having to do with the use to which we put the relevant models; even in the case where partial isomorphism is an equivalence relation, this use is crucial. This is, in effect, to repeat the point made previously and that also acts as a response to the non-sufficiency objection: namely, that we agree that partial isomorphism is not sufficient and that other factors must be appealed to.
However, as French ([2003] ) has emphasized, the role of such factors is not straightforward and certainly not constitutive of the mechanism of representation, in the particularities (that is, although it is true that all representation must involve such factors, it is not the case that these factors are always the same). The importance of intentions is often illustrated by comparing the case of a face drawn in the sand by someone, and that of what appears to be a face, etched in the sand by the wind and waves, say. The former counts as representation-so the usual story goes-and the latter does not, because of the role of intentions in the former. But now compare a face etched in the sand by the action of the wind and waves, and the equation 'E ¼ mc 2 ', similarly etched. In the case of the face, the crucial issue is whether the squiggles in the sand should be regarded as a representation, or an art object in general. Here one must appeal to the relevant intentions or its causal provenance more generally, which will include the relevant causal history, the role of the artist and so forth. (It is confusion over such provenance that has led to art installations being thrown away as rubbish.) On these grounds, the squiggles would not be taken to be representational. In the case of the equation, however, even if we had observed someone inscribing it in the sand and therefore were assured that the relevant intentions were playing an appropriate role and that the relevant provenance was in place, we would not take it as the theory, or the relevant part thereof, because of the standard objections to so regarding particular inscriptions. Whatever the intentions of the person doing the etching, we would not say that those particular squiggles are the Special Theory of Relativity (or relevant part thereof) that represents the relevant phenomena. Given that the theory is something other than the inscription in the sand, the issue of the particular intentions behind that specific inscription becomes less significant when considering the representational nature of the theory.
Of course, as Chakravartty points out, we would read the squiggles as 'E ¼ mc 2 ' in the first place only because we possess the prior intention to use markings of that form to represent the relevant phenomena. Someone not trained or educated in the appropriate way would have no such intention and would indeed see nothing but squiggles in the sand. However, this seems a different issue, and as French ([2003] ) went on to acknowledge, in order for us to see a painting as about a certain scene, a certain person, or whatever, we must be able to interpret the splashes of paint a certain way, and that will certainly depend on the broader context. But as he emphasized, we should not effectively incorporate a particular intention into the mechanism of representation, such that the latter becomes fixed, in the sense that Le Dejeuner sur l'Herbe must represent a set of bourgeois young people, or Einstein's special relativity must represent phenomena associated with rods and clocks. Rather both artworks and theories enter into a multiplicity of representational relationships, and if the intentions of the artist or scientist are not to be privileged in a problematic way (consider the shift wrought by Minkowski with regard to the special theory of relativity), then we must allow for pragmatic or broadly contextual factors to play a role in selecting which of these relationships to focus on. 'Building' particular intentions into the representational mechanism would then be disastrous.
Returning to the example of Guernica, here we agree that there is a multiplicity of interpretations and hence of representational relationships, and indeed there may be no agreement about what is being represented. However, unless we have some partial mapping in place (as represented at the meta-level as it were by partial isomorphisms), then it is not even clear what is being interpreted. Without such a mapping we would be clueless! And again, the lack of agreement can be nicely accommodated by separating off the intentions issue from that of the underlying mechanism, thus allowing Picasso's intentions to be overridden by ours.
Mechanism
The 'enigma' of representation derives from the point that not only must targets be described in certain ways, but that different descriptions will lead to different structures and hence representational relationships. With this we can only agree and insist that we do not see it as a problem. Of course, the system must be described in such a way that one can take the relevant structure to apply. What would that description involve? Well, at the very least some minimal mathematics and certain physical assumptions. Without those the target system could not even be said to be a candidate for scientific representation in the first place! And that different descriptions will lead to different structures is surely a fact of scientific practice that is to be welcomed since its accommodation by our account is one of the advantages we claim it has over the alternatives. Typically, at all but the most basic level, these different descriptions will involve the importation of elements and relations from other such descriptions, perhaps even from other domains, and the general framework of partial structures is clearly capable of accommodating these moves (see, e.g. French and Ladyman [1997] ; Bueno [2000] ).
Style
Here one must again be careful in drawing comparisons with art (Frigg [2006] , p. 50). It may well be the case that artists have available a wider variety of media than scientists, and this may generate the impression that different styles need to be accommodated by the relevant accounts of representation in both cases. However, if 'style' of representation is identified with the medium of representation, we must not confuse this with the mechanism of representation. Scientists do use different media for their models-some are theoretical and 'abstract', others are physical-but one of the claims of the partial structures approach is that it can accommodate this because the underlying relationships have the same form and, given again appropriate descriptions of the different kinds of models so as to allow a structure to be associated with them, these relationships can be captured via partial isomorphisms (or partial homomorphisms). Again we see it as one of the virtues of our approach that it can do this.
As for the claim that we advocate a normative stance towards partial isomorphisms but this is incompatible with their inadequacy due to the inaccuracy of scientific representations, the second part of that claim is clearly false: they are not inadequate in this sense. In effect we are being tarred with the same brush as those who advocate isomorphisms despite our protests that our account is different in precisely this respect. With the introduction of partial isomorphism and homomorphism, no requirement is made that the structures that are used to represent other structures do so with perfect accuracy.
With regard to the normative claim, we are not demanding that scientists adopt the partial structures account, nor are we even insisting that this is the only framework for representations that philosophers of science must adopt. Certainly, we have advocated a different 'style' of representation when it comes to the relationship between mathematics and science, namely partial isomorphism or partial homomorphism, and it may well be the case that different kinds of relationships require different formal frameworks. However, the challenge then would be to show that such frameworks offer the same advantages as ours (in particular, with regard to its unitary nature) when it comes to the relationships we encounter in science which, we think, can be appropriately and straightforwardly accommodated by partial isomorphisms (or other morphisms).
Misrepresentation
Here, again one must be careful and pay due attention to the differences between art and science. Of course, cases of mistargeting do arise in science, in the sense that scientists may think that the cause of a particular phenomenon is a certain system, and construct the appropriate representation, only to find that the cause is something else. But the difference from the example of Velázquez's painting of the Pope, as presented above, again has to do with the diachronic features of science: we discover that the representation has the wrong target and adjust accordingly. Indeed, the misrepresenting model may, and typically will, be heuristically fruitful and contain the elements that lead to its successor. The inter-theory relationships this involves are precisely the sorts of things the partial structures account was set up to capture (da Costa and French [2003] ). Likewise, as noted already, inaccurate or unfaithful representations are absolutely not a problem for the partial isomorphism account. And of course, with regard to the Newtonian example, the question that was posed can be answered once we have General Relativity and the respects and extent of the dissimilarity become apparent. The relationship between the two theories is then most appropriately captured via partial structures and the representational relationships between each and the solar system can be accommodated via partial isomorphisms.
Now those who are familiar with the debate over the nature of mental representation (see, for example, Cummins [1991] ) might object that the problem of misrepresentation is more basic than this, in that the mechanism of partial isomorphism (or structural similarity more generally) does not have the means to accommodate misrepresentation in its own terms. More specifically, the objection is that, since something A represents B exactly if A is (partially) isomorphic to B, our approach does not provide the conceptual resources to describe a case of misrepresentation, i.e. a case in which A represents B but in the wrong way. Thus, our account of representation is unable to express the notion of misrepresentation.
However, we can respond to this along the lines already indicated. If we consider a particular partial structure, characterizing a theory or model that is proposed as representing a certain system via partial isomorphism, then that structure itself does not have the means, within it, as it were, to express the possibility that it may have misrepresented that system. But that is to be expected. When it comes to scientific representations, as we have already indicated, scientists discover that their model is a misrepresentation (typically) through lack of empirical success, to some degree or other. They then adjust, modify, or otherwise change the model, or develop a new one entirely, to yield something that better represents the system (obviously this is a rather crude caricature of the process!). 21 These revised or new models can of course be characterized via partial structures and their relationships to their predecessors represented by partial morphisms. Hence, it is not true that because a particular partial structure does not have the means to express its own misrepresenting of the system, our account as a whole is unable to express this notion. It does so through the interrelationships between the increasingly successful models that, because of this success, can be regarded as increasingly better, more informative representations. And in the case of science, at least, this is surely as it should be.
Of course, as just noted, there is a form of misrepresentation that is accommodated within particular partial structures, namely, when the relevant model includes idealizations and such like. This is a form of deliberate misrepresentation for the purposes of simplicity, computational tractability, and so forth.
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Ontology
The broader concern here, to do with the ontology of models and representational devices in general, obviously involves a quite general set of issues that we do not need to resolve in this article. Nevertheless, some comments are in order. First of all, as da Costa and French ([2003] ) have tried to make clear, advocates of the semantic account need not be committed to the ontological claim that models are structures. This presumed reification has generated considerable criticism of the approach, but it is time it should be laid to rest. Set-theoretic structures provide a useful representational (or better, perhaps, descriptive) device at the meta-level of the philosophy of science. What theories and models are, qua objects, is then a further matter.
One might think that a variety of positions on the nature of models (such as, for example, that they are abstract objects) could accommodate their role as representational devices. However, Hughes ([1997] ) has argued that because models involve abstraction and idealization, they must be regarded as abstract objects, and as such cannot stand in relations of similarity with physical systems. The motivation for this last move is not clear, however. It might be grounded in a restrictive view of similarity such that the abstracting away of certain properties removes the basis for relating in this way the idealized and non-idealized models that possess them. So, to draw on a much used example, it might be insisted that by abstracting away friction and air resistance, the (idealized) model of a simple pendulum cannot then be related by similarity to an actual pendulum. But, of course, the model and the actual system share other properties-most notably, length of string, mass of bob, and so on-via which they can still be held to enter into a similarity relationship. The possible response that an idealized length that encounters no friction at point of contact, or a mass that encounters no air resistance, cannot be held to be similar to their actual counterparts strikes us as implausible (or, at the very least, as requiring an appropriate account of property identity!).
Alternatively, Hughes' move might ultimately be grounded in the view that similarity cannot be a cross-category relation, such that it cannot be taken to hold between abstract and actual objects. However, this again seems implausible. Consider, for example, the relation between Jody and Ian such that Jody is taller than Ian. This is similar to the relevant relation between the numbers that correspond to Jody and Ian's respective heights. There seems to be no objection to maintaining the existence of such a similarity in this case, and hence we likewise see no objection to taking similarity to hold between theories, taken as abstract, and systems, taken as concrete.
With regard to the variety objection, let us consider each case in turn. The first of these examples is not particularly troubling, as it is acknowledged that 'similarity is almost always the means for concrete physical representations of concrete physical objects' (Suárez [2003] , p. 231) such as this. Likewise, in the case of a graph representing a real bridge, it is recognized that 'the graph [. . .] is similar to the bridge it represents with respect to the geometric shape and proportions between the different points' (Suárez [2003] ). The example of a system of billiard balls representing a gas initially appears more difficult to deal with. However, there is the similarity between the dynamical properties of the two systems (as discussed in da Costa and French [2003] ), and it is the dynamical properties of a gas that we attempt to explain by appeal to the billiard ball model.
The fourth case of the quantum diffusion equation may appear to be the most difficult. However, Chakravartty, again, has noted that this is no counter-example since it is the semantic content-articulated perhaps through the appropriate mathematical structure, such as configuration space-that is to be regarded as similar to the target, not the superficial representation of this content via pen and paper, or chalk and board. Indeed, we would insist that insofar as the equation is satisfied in the relevant model, it is the structure encapsulated in the latter that is truly important. Equations do not represent by themselves (or perhaps we can say that their representational capacity is 'parasitic' on that of the underlying structures); rather it is the models that function as the relevant medium. Here, we bump up against broader issues to do with arguments in favour of the semantic approach to theories and models in general. Given that our account is articulated within this approach, we can turn to the accepted understanding of how it treats equations-namely, by taking them to be satisfied in the relevant models-in order to appropriately locate the underlying representational device, that is, the relevant structures.
Conclusion
If the considerations advanced here are near the mark, it is possible to offer an account of scientific representation that, while emphasizing the significance of a formal framework, can still accommodate the ways representations function in scientific practice. The result is a view that, being sensitive to the partiality of scientific information, is well positioned to make sense of the way in which scientific representation is so often-despite its extraordinary success-quite incomplete. As Budd's work indicates, there may be scope for a similar account to be applied to representation in art, and the parallels we have noted with regard to the treatment of apparently inconsistent representations, in particular, support this. Of course the differences we have touched upon above must also be taken into consideration and hence any such unitary account will have to be appropriately nuanced in relevant respects. In conclusion, then, we see our discussion as contributing to a broader debate about the comparison between representation in science and art in general.
